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TURNING INSIDER TRADING INSIDE OUT
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
INTRODUCTION
Ineffective insider trading rules represent one of the most significant
roadblocks for United States investment in most European securities mar-
kets.' Several proposals have framed a solution by calling for the complete
symmetry between United States and European securities markets.' Less
than twenty years ago, the United States' harsh insider trading3 laws were
1. See generally Sam S. Miller, Regulating Financial Services in the United Kingdom-
An American Perspective, 44 Bus. LAW. 323 (1989); Stephen J. Leacock, In Search of a Gi-
ant Leap: Curtailing Insider Trading in International Securities Markets by the Reform of In-
sider Trading Laws Under the European Union Council Directive 89/592, 3 TULSA J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 51 (1995) (it took Germany two years to comply with the European Union Insider
Trading Directive). Compare Eugenio Ruggiero, The Regulation of Insider Trading in Italy,
22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 157 (1996) (arguing that although Italy's Insider Trading Act of 1991
imposes criminal sanctions against defendants even when no insider trading takes place, the
Act has not been effective because Italian courts have yet to interpret or apply it), with Not So
Simple (Newly Created Financial Institution in Italy Will Act as a Stockbroker and a Fund
Manager), ECONOMIST, July 6, 1991, at 85 (discussing how Italy is one of the most visible
examples of a stock market dominated by insiders); Christine A. McGuiness, Note, Toward
the Unification of European Capital Markets: The EEC's Proposed Directive on Insider
Trading, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 432 (1988) (discussing the proposed insider trading regula-
tions in the Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland).
2. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1454 (1997).
"The SEC has identified 'harmonization,' or the minimization of differences between regula-
tory systems, as a central goal for international securities markets." Id.
3. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES 810-11 (6th ed. 1998). An officer or director of a corporation may have
knowledge about corporate affairs which will affect the price or value of the corporate shares
before it becomes known to the general public or to other shareholders. As a result, the direc-
tor or officer may be tempted to make a personal profit by either purchasing or selling shares
without disclosing the information. Such trading is called "insider trading." See id. Rule
lOb-5, promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 is the
source of most current principles relating to transactions in securities by officers, directors
and others. Rule lOb-5 was originally promulgated because the express anti-fraud remedy
sections of the federal securities laws applied only to buyers of securities and the SEC wished
to extend remedies to sellers of shares. See id. Rule lob-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
1
Hostetter: Turning Insider Trading Inside Out in the European Union
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1999
176 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30
rather exceptional. However, today, a growing number of countries in the
European Union (EU)4 have adopted laws to remedy insider trading, origi-
nally at the behest of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)5 and
today, largely under the auspices of the European Union's Council Directive
89/592 (EU Directive).6 Adopted in 1989, the EU Directive mandated mem-
ber states to enact insider trading legislation that met or exceeded certain
minimum requirements by June 1, 1992.' The EU has taken significant steps
to ensure a truly barrier-free, pan-European securities market.8 However, it is
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1999). See also Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829
(D. Del. 1951) ("The duty of disclosure stems from necessity of preventing a corporate insider
from utilizing his position to take unfair advantage of the uninformed minority stockhold-
ers."); Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (duty to disclose
under Rule lob-5 arises when "directors and officers who, in purchasing the stock of the cor-
poration from others, fail to disclose a fact coming to their knowledge by reason of their posi-
tion, which would materially affect the judgment of the other party to the transaction.").
4. The European Union currently consists of the following countries: France, Germany,
the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Denmark,
and Ireland. Austria, Sweden, and Finland accepted membership in 1994 bringing the total
number to 15 countries. The European Union (EU) has also entered into an agreement with
the remaining nations of the European Free Trade Association ("EFTA") (Iceland, Liechten-
stein, Norway, and Switzerland (unratified)). See Paul B. Stephan, The New International
Law- Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 COLO.
L. REV. 1555, 1572-75 (1999).
5. Section 4(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 establishes the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). See Securities Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1994). The SEC
is an independent regulatory body consisting of "five commissioners to be appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate." Id. The Act directs that commissioners
"shall be appointed alternatively as nearly as may be practicable" from different political par-
ties. Id. The SEC has primary responsibility for implementing the Act and regulating United
States securities markets, including rule making, market oversight and enforcement. See id.
6. See Council Directive 89/592 on Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing, O.J. L.
334/30 (1989) [hereinafter EU Directive]. The EU's Council Directive 89/592 was first pro-
posed in 1987. However, the European Commission had been examining alternatives for deal-
ing with insider trading since 1976. The earlier studies produced the "Commission's Recom-
mendation Concerning a European Code of Conduct Relating to Transferable Securities,"
which was received without much enthusiasm. See Manning Gilbert Warren III, The Regula-
tion of Insider Trading in the European Community, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1037, 1043-45
(1991).
7. See KAREN V. KOLE & ANTHONY D'AMATO, EUROPEAN UNION LAW ANTHOLOGY 126-
48 (1982). Under the Treaty of Rome, directives are essentially orders to enact legislation
given to the member states and issued by the Council and the Commission. See id. Except for
regulations issued by the Council or the Commission, institutions do not generally have the
authority to enact laws for the Community as a whole. Rather, the Council and Commission
are vested with the power to demand that member states enact laws that further the goals of
the Treaty of Rome. See id.
8. See generally Todd A. Sulger, Comment, Harmonization of Securities Market Regula-
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clear to both investors in Europe and the United States, that the vagaries of
insider trading have yet to be resolved.
For several reasons, the EU Directive has not effectively curbed insider
trading, and therefore, not attracted the confidence or loyalty of United
States investment in the European market.9 First, after a lengthy history of
sophisticated development in securities regulation, the United States is not
eager to scale back on its securities requirements simply in the name of har-
monization and convergence. United States investors are generally more in-
clined to invest in well developed and modernized financial markets rather
than treading into emerging markets which are unfamiliar and still struggling
to secure a basic, stable, economic infra-structure.'" The European continent
constitutes a relatively familiar and well-developed financial market. How-
ever, the nature and implications of the EU Directive sit uncomfortably with
United States investors who are used to securing their prospects on implied
causes of action and precedent. Second, European countries are not enam-
ored with the idea of being forced to abide by what undoubtedly constitutes
a United States dominated securities regulatory scheme. Finally, at the root
of the discrepancies and discomfort currently posing a hindrance to what
could be a confident and efficient financial exchange between the United
States and EU, are the differences in legal culture." One of the first steps in
approaching incongruous securities market regulations is recognizing that
cultural and legal distinctions are not easily eradicated. Therefore, these dif-
ferences should be considered, minimized, and incorporated into the regula-
tion of transnational securities markets.
A certain level of harmonization is necessary to foster a common area of
lions in the European Union: Is the Price Tag Too High?, 29 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 221 (1998)
(describing a number of directives that were implemented in order to orchestrate the harmoni-
zation of the EU member states' securities regulation requirements including the Admissions
Directive, the Interim Reports Directive, and the Listing Particulars Directive).
9. The measures necessary to achieve honesty and efficiency are different in each mem-
ber state due to varying market structures existing in the EU. While the directives achieve a
minimum level of regulation, member states are still free to set their own bar, which may or
may not be higher. See generally Andreas J. Roquette, New Developments Relating to the In-
ternationalization of the Capital Markets: A Comparison of Legislative Reforms in the United
States, the European Community, and Germany, 14 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 565 (1994); see
Joel P. Trachtman, Unilateralism, Bilateralism, Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Function-
alism: A Comparison with Reference to Securities Regulation, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 69, 83 (1994) (discussing how emerging financial markets are often faced with the
lack of accounting and compliance infrastructures necessary for successful operation of a
complex securities market).
10. See John Reed, Central European Economic Review: Banks in the Balance, WALL
ST. J. EUR., Sept. 28, 1998, at 12, available in 1998 WL-WSJE 12732629. "In Poland and
Hungary, the two countries to open earliest and widest to Western capital, foreigners have
sparked a revolution of sorts in banking, investing capital to upgrade technology and
strengthen banks' asset bases." Id.
11. See generally Gerhard Wegen, Congratulations From Your Continental Cousins,
10b-5: Securities Fraud Regulation From the European Perspective, 61 FORDHAM L. REV.
S57 (1993); Keith D. Nunes et al., French & SEC Regulations: The Search for Transparency
and Openness in Decisionmaking, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 217 (1993).
1999]
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understanding between countries with otherwise very different legal, politi-
cal, and social foundations. 2 However, such commonality must be tempered
with the added effort of mutual recognition and respect for each other's vari-
ances and cultural identities. This is important because it is evident that
European countries are wary of relinquishing their sovereign authority and
domestic identity to a supra national EU regulatory body. Furthermore, the
economic gains may not be enough to make up for the loss in cultural sover-
eignty. 3 Harmonization may not be the simplest manner to implement a suc-
cessful securities market regime in co-existence between the United States
and European securities markets. However, it may constitute an approach
which both the United States and Europe can live with.
Part I outlines the United States' perspective on insider trading and its
development via statutes, judicial interpretations, and legislative initiatives,
and the EU's response to insider trading, focusing on EU Directive 89/592.'
Part II examines potential limitations and difficulties of harmonizing insider
trading rules by considering the United States' concern with avoiding a sys-
tem of regulations which meet only bare minimum requirements, the diffi-
culties in understanding and agreeing upon terms defining insider trading,
and the extent of their impact. This section also addresses the more abstract
concept and importance of legal cultural distinctions between the United
States and the EU. Finally, by projecting the practice of subsidiarity to the
arena of insider trading regulations, Part III offers an approach for reconcil-
ing varying insider trading regulations with the goal of increasing United
States participation and confidence in the European securities market.
12. See generally James A. Fanto, The Absence of Cross-Cultural Communication: SEC
Mandatory Disclosure and Foreign Corporate Governance, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 119
(1996). Scholars have acknowledged that these solutions, which fall under the general head-
ing of corporate governance, do not arise solely from the evolution of some fundamental eco-
nomic order or logic, but are shaped by social, political, and more generally, cultural forces,
often unique to a particular country. The foremost United States advocate of this position is
Professor Roe, who explains the development of United States corporate governance from a
political perspective. See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 10 (1991). According to Professor Roe, economic development led to the
rise of the large public corporation with dispersed shareholders and professional managers.
How a particular country responds to this phenomenon to produce a corporate governance
"equilibrium" or solution characteristic of that country depends upon numerous ideological,
political and historical factors ("cultural" factors) in addition to economic forces. See id. Non-
United States academics and writers have also examined their own, and other, corporate gov-
ernance systems. See, e.g., EUROPEAN BUSINESS LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES ON
INTEGRATION AND HARMONIZATION (Richard M. Buxbaum et al. eds., 1991) (reviewing
worldwide harmonization and capital market developments).
13. See Sulger, supra note 8, at 238-39.
14. See EU Directive, supra note 6.
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I. OVERVIEW OF INSIDER TRADING
A. United States Perspective on Insider Trading
The prosecution of insider trading violations has been more vigorous in
the United States than in any other country.'" This rigor stems from the tradi-
tional belief that insider trading violates basic notions of fairness and un-
dermines public confidence in the integrity of the stock market. Neverthe-
less, Congress has never precisely defined insider trading. Generally
considered a term of art, insider trading refers to any unlawful trading of
publicly traded securities by persons possessing material, nonpublic infor-
mation. 6 As a result, a combination of innovative legislative tools and crea-
tive judicial interpretations have formed the basis of United States insider
trading jurisprudence.
1. Statutory Framework
Originally, regulation of insider trading was founded on a system of dis-
closure provided for in the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA of
1934).'" Congress hoped to avoid the problem of insider trading by requiring
multiple disclosures through continuous reporting obligations, and by pro-
viding for, in section 16 of the SEA of 1934, the reporting of securities
transactions, and the preclusion of short-swing trading by certain insiders.'"
15. See HAMILTON, supra note 3, at 817-18. Supreme Court decisions reflect an expan-
sive and broad reading of Rule lOb-5. In addition, several procedural advantages exist to en-
courage the use of Rule lOb-5, "including nationwide service of process under 15 U.S.C. § 27
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, liberal venue provisions, and generous discovery
rules." Id. Further, "the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction permits a federal court to hear both
the rule lOb-5 claim and the state claim in a single proceeding." Id. "The United States and
the Commission [SEC] have been world leaders in outlawing and prosecuting insider trad-
ing." James R. Doty, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in an Internation-
alized Marketplace, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 577, S83 (1992).
16. See generally Bryan C. Smith, Comment, Possession Versus Use: Reconciling the
Letter and the Spirit of Insider Trading Regulation Under Rule 10b-5, 35 CAL. W. L. REV.
371 (1999).
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1994).
18. See HAMILTON, supra note 3, at 899-900. Section 16(b) of the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934 provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale
and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted secu-
rity) within any period of less than six months, unless such security was acquired
in good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be
recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such benefi-
cial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the se-
curity purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six
months ....
15 U.S.C. § 78(p) (1988). See generally Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the
1999l
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Indeed, section 16(b) imposes strict liability on insiders for short-swing prof-
its regardless of the nature of the information used in making the trade.
However, its potential as an effective weapon against insider trading is
flawed because only a corporation or a shareholder that sues derivatively
may bring a section 16(b) action. This limitation has left the SEC powerless
to prosecute section 16(b) violations.
As concern over insider trading increased, section 10(b) of the SEA of
1934 and Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder, became the most common
used sources of authority to regulate insider trading offenses. Rule lOb-5 is a
general anti-fraud prohibition that makes the use of any "device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud,"'9 any misleading statement of material fact, or the opera-
tion of any fraud or deceit on any person in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security unlawful."0 The broad and general language of Rule lOb-
5 provides both the rule's strength and weakness.2 While its failure to define
insider trading has led to confusion among market professionals, this ambi-
guity has also provided the flexibility federal courts need to respond to al-
leged violations. Accordingly, judicial interpretation of the anti-fraud rules
has alternately expanded or contracted, as their reach is modified to suit dif-
ferent circumstances. 3
2. Judicial Interpretation
Rule 1Ob-5 was found to create an implied right in a private cause of ac-
tion for the first time in the 1946 case of Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.24
The opportunity for private claims strengthened the detection and punish-
ment of insider trading violations. 5 Rule lOb-5's reach was truly tested,
however, in In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,26 where it was applied to corporate
outsiders trading on nonpublic information.27 Adopting the SEC's preference
Management of Publicly Held Companies, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 391 (1991) (detailing the enact-
ment of Section 16 of the SEA and the purpose of Section 16(b)).
19. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
20. See id. See generally Lawrence 1. Zweifach, Basic Principles of the Law of Insider
Trading, 1070 PLI/CORP. 467 (1998); Paul H. Dawes, The Mens Requirement for Criminal
Liability Under Section lOb and Rule 1Ob-5, 1070 PLI/CoRP. 515 (1998).
21. See generally Charles Vaughn Baltic, 1II, The Next Step in Insider Trading Regula-
tion: International Cooperative Efforts in the Global Securities Market, 23 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 167 (1992) (noting that Congress has yet to clearly define the crime of insider
trading).
22. See id. at 175.
23. See generally Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Insider Trading as a Transactional Cost:
A Market Microstructure Justification and Optimization of Insider Trading Regulation, 26
CONN. L. REV. 1 (1993) (discussing how insider trading should be regulated from an eco-
nomic perspective).
24. 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
25. See id.
26. 1961 WL 3743 (S.E.C.).
27. See id. at * 1. The S.E.C. reasoned that the unfair advantage gained by access to non-
6
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for a sweeping prohibition, courts applied the catch-all "disclose or abstain
rule." First announced in SEC. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,2 this rule requires
anyone possessing material, nonpublic information about a corporation to
either disclose the information publicly, or to refrain from trading in its secu-
rities.29 Even temporary insiders such as lawyers, accountants, and invest-
ment bankers have been held to this duty?0 Most important, courts have also
extended insider trading liability to tippees, individuals who receive nonpub-
lic information from an insider.3'
However, several constraints have been placed on the scope of insider
trading liability. In Chiarella v. United States,32 the Supreme Court held that
the duty to disclose arises only when a fiduciary relationship exists between
the trader and the corporation.33 In Chiarella, an employee of a financial
printing firm traded on information left at the printer regarding tender of-
fers.' The employee was found not to have a sufficiently close relationship
of trust and confidence with the tendered companies and its shareholders to
trigger the duty to disclose or abstain.33 As a result, the Court found not only
that the mere possession of nonpublic information is insufficient to create a
duty to disclose or abstain, but also, that even trading on nonpublic informa-
tion is not in itself enough to incur liability under Rule 10b-5.36
In Dirks v. SEC,3" the Supreme Court defined the relationship between a
breach of a fiduciary duty and tipper-tippee liability. In Dirks, for the tipper
to be found to have breached his fiduciary duty, the Court required the tipper
to communicate inside information to a tippee for "pecuniary gain."'3' The
Court reasoned that "[a]bsent some personal gain, there has been no breach
of duty to the stockholders. '39 Because the tippee's duty is derivative of the
tipper's duty, there can be no liability for the tippee absent a breach of duty
by the insider. ' To escape these limitations, some courts have relied upon a
misappropriation theory,"' which was first enunciated by Chief Justice Bur-
public information justified subjecting the defendant to liability. See id. at *7.
28. 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
29. See id.
30. See Dirks v. SEC., 463 U.S. 646, 655 (1983).
31. See id. at 647.
32. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
33. See id. at 230.
34. See id. at 224.
35. See id. at 232-33.
36. See id. at 235-36.
37. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
38. Id. at 659. In Dirks, a stock analyst disclosed to his clients the nonpublic information
that the assets of Equity Funding of America were vastly overstated. See id. at 648-50. The
analyst received the information from a corporate insider who was motivated not by personal
gain but rather by the desire to reveal corporate fraud. See id.
39. id. at 662.
40. See id.
41. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd, 722 F.2d 729 (2d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 863 (1983).
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ger in his dissent in Chiarella.4' Under this theory of liability, a duty to dis-
close or abstain is imposed on any person who has misappropriated or stolen
nonpublic information."3 However, the Supreme Court still requires a breach
of a fiduciary duty."
Finally, in United States v. O'Hagan,4' the Supreme Court held that by
giving the SEC authority to regulate nondeceptive activities as a reasonably
designed means of preventing manipulative acts under section 14(e) of the
SEA of 1934, the "Commission may prohibit acts, not themselves fraudulent
under the common law or § 10(b), if the prohibition is 'reasonably designed
to prevent ... acts and practices [that] are fraudulent."'" However, O'Hagan
leaves blurred some of the contours of the tort of trading on undisclosed ten-
der offer information. In particular, it is unclear whether mere "possession"
of insider information is sufficient to constitute a prohibitive fraudulent act
under section 14(e) of the SEA of 1934 because the Court described the
wrong as trading "on the basis" of inside information." Insider trading can
be sanctioned by the SEC like violations of Rules lOb-5 or 14e-3, in an in-
junctive action or agency disciplinary proceeding. 8 Furthermore, in 1988,
Congress increased sanctions for insider trading by creating a private right of
action on behalf of contemporaneous traders. 9 Additionally, Congress in-
serted a new bounty provision for informers on insider trading,' increased
criminal fines," and gave the SEC greater authority to investigate interna-
tional securities law violations. 2 Though the Court in O'Hagan purported to
decide when a person who is neither a corporate insider, nor a temporary in-
sider is forbidden from trading based on material,53 nonpublic information, a
rather confusing opinion left many questions unresolved.' Whatever resolu-
42. 445 U.S. at 240-45 (Burger, J., dissenting).
43. See id. at 240.
44. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987) (the Court deadlocked on the
issue of whether a financial newspaper reporter misappropriated information that was to be
discussed in future newspaper columns, and whether this created Rule lOb-5 liability even
though the reporter did not owe a fiduciary duty to the companies or their shareholders).
45. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
46. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1994)).
47. See id. at 676-77.
48. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(1), (d)(3), 78u-2, 78u-3 (1994).
49. See id. § 78t-I(a).
50. See id. § 78u-l(e).
51. See id. § 78ff(a).
52. See id. § 78b(l).
53. In TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Cir-
cuit's application of materiality and held that "an omitted fact is material if there is a substan-
tial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote." 426 U.S. 438, 439 (1976). Materiality is a controlling concept when allegations of
fraud are alleged and is a mixed question of law and fact. See id. at 449-50. Generally the
concept of materiality has been defined as information "which might have been considered
important by a reasonable" investor and then that the test requires "a significant propensity to
affect" investors. Id. at 449.
54. See Richard W. Painter et al., Don't Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United
8
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tions or proposals the SEC or Congress employ to clarify the definition of
insider trading, they will both have to consider that securities laws were de-
signed to protect investors and the well being of an investor who trades with
a person in possession of material, nonpublic information.5
3. Legislative Initiatives
In spite of the conflicting theories of liability employed by the judiciary,
it remains well settled that insider trading offenses under Rule 10b-5 require
proof that the trade involved a violation of a fiduciary duty. 6 Moreover, a
tippee can only be held liable when the insider has breached a duty to the
company or its shareholders, and the tippee knew, or should have known
such a breach occurred." In 1980, in an attempt to counteract the impact of
this requirement in the arena of corporate takeovers, the SEC promulgated
Rule 14e-3.58 This rule expressly prohibits anyone possessing information
relating to a tender offer from trading if she 1) knows or has reason to know
that the information is nonpublic; 2) and knows or has reason to know that it
has been acquired directly or indirectly from persons associated with either
the acquiring or target company.59 Therefore, unlike an action under Rule
States v. O'Hagan, 84 VA. L. REv. 153-54 (1998). Concerned with the logic and predictabil-
ity of the case law of O'Hagan and other civil and criminal penalties, an amicus curie brief
was filed by Law Professors in support of Respondent. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Profes-
sors and Counsel in Support of Respondent, United States of America v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S.
642 (1997) (No. 96-842), available in 1997 WL 143793. In their amicus brief, the authors
urge the Supreme Court to affirm the Eighth Circuit's holding arguing that the misappropria-
tion theory does not comport with the text of, or purpose of, the SEA of 1934. See id.
55. See Painter et al., supra note 54, at 228 n.5.
56. See HAMILTON, supra note 3, at 833.
57. See id.
58. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1994).
59. Rule 14e-3 provides in pertinent part:
(a) If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has com-
menced, a tender offer (the "offering person"), it shall constitute a fraudulent, de-
ceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of the
Act for any other person who is in possession of material information relating to
such tender offer which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic
and which he knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly
from:
(1) The offering person,
(2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer,
(3) Any officer, director, partner or employee or any other person acting on
behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to purchase or sell or cause to be
purchased or sold any of such securities or any securities convertible into or
exchangeable for any such securities or any option or right to obtain or dis-
pose of any of the foregoing securities, unless within a reasonable time prior
to any purchase or sale such information and its source are publicly disclosed
by press release or otherwise.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1994). See also United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 560 (2d Cir.
1999]
9
Hostetter: Turning Insider Trading Inside Out in the European Union
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1999
184 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30
10b-5, a Rule 14e-3 action does not require a breach of a fiduciary duty.'
In the context of takeovers, the SEC has set a trap to ensnare would-be
insider traders. Although Rule 14e-3's application is limited to tender offers,
its adoption and use by the SEC, underscores the agency's preference for an
interpretation of insider trading that focuses on the mere possession of mate-
rial, nonpublic information rather than on a breach of a fiduciary duty.6
Moreover, because a large amount of insider trading abuses relate to take-
overs, Rule 14e-3 is an effective regulatory addition to the legislative tools
used to thwart this practice."
4. Enforcement
Insiders who willfully violate securities laws are subject to both crimi-
nal and civil penalties. Criminal penalties include prison sentences of up to
ten years, and fines of up to $1 million for individuals, and up to $2.5 mil-
lion for corporations.63 Civil liability includes fines, disgorgement of profits,
and injunctions against further securities trading." However, notwithstand-
ing these stiff penalties and the increased scrutiny of investment houses, the
1980s witnessed several notable insider trading scandals. In 1986, the SEC
1991) (the court held that "the language and legislative history of section 14e [of the 1934
Act], as well as congressional inactivity toward it since the SEC promulgated Rule 14e-3(a),
all support the view that Congress empowered the SEC to prescribe a rule that extends be-
yond the common law.").
60. Exploiting this difference between the rules, the Second Circuit, in its en banc deci-
sion in Chestman, applied Rule 14e-3 to extend liability to a remote tippee who would not
otherwise have been liable under Rule lOb-5. See Chestman, 947 F.2d 551-64. In Chestman, a
senior company official at Waldbaum told his sister that a tender offer was about to be made
for his company. See id. at 555. His sister then passed the information to her daughter who
then passed it on to her husband (Loeb) who in turn disclosed news of the impending bid to
his stockbroker (Chestman). See id. Chestman then purchased shares of Waldbaum stock for
his personal and customer accounts. See id. Chestman was not found liable under Rule lOb-5
as there was insufficient evidence of a breach of fiduciary duty between the tipper, Loeb and
Waldbaum. See id. at 571. However, Chestman was convicted under Rule 14e-3, as his trades
were based on possession of information related to a tender offer that he knew or had reason
to know was both nonpublic and supplied (directly or indirectly) by an insider. See id.
61. See Smith, supra note 16, at 371 (though the SEC is concerned about demonstrating
the link between possession and use of insider information, the Ninth Circuit currently en-
dorses a causation standard which requires proof of actual use of information to constitute a
Rule lob-5 violation).
62. Congress has adopted several measures to combat the misuse of privileged market
information. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act gives the SEC the authority to seek civil pen-
alties up to three times the profits made from the unlawful purchase or sale of securities. See
15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1998). In 1988, Congress also passed the Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act (ITSFEA). See id. ITSFEA imposes civil penalties on "controlling
persons" who know or should have known that individuals under their supervision are likely
to engage in insider trading. See § 78u-3 (1998).
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l (1988).
64. See generally Matthew A. Aufman, Civil Liability Under Exchange Act Rule JOb-5
for Misappropriators of Nonpublic Information: An Argument for Consistency, 40 B.C. L.
REV. 829 (1999).
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successfully prosecuted Dennis Levine, a former director of Drexel Burnham
Lambert, for trading on insider information at an estimated profit of over
$12 million.' That same year, arbitrageur Ivan Boesky paid a fine for pur-
chasing securities prior to takeover announcements that was more than eight
times Levine's estimated profit." Finally, the scandal involving Michael
Milken, who made more than $550 million from the securities business in
1987 alone, dwarfed the stir created by both Boesky and Levine.67
The outrage these scandals ignited in the United States illustrate that
public frustration concerning insider trading can be one of the most impor-
tant deterrents against it.6 Add to this the SEC's formidable resources for the
enforcement of securities laws, and it is understandable why the United
States is one of the worlds most hostile environments for insider trading.'
However, in spite of the comprehensive statutory scheme in the United
States, it remains dependent on case law for full legal guidance. This results
in lingering confusion as to the precise contours of "insider trading."
65. See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Heyman Center's Roundtable on In-
sider Trading: Law, Policy, and Theory After O'Hagan, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 1 (1998).
66. See, e.g., Nancy Reichman, Insider Trading, 18 CRIME & JUST. 55 (1993). Over the
past 15 years, insider trading scandals have received substantial media attention. In the 1980s,
there were countless front-page stories about insider trading prosecutions against high-
powered deal makers such as Ivan F. Boesky, Michael R. Milken, and Dennis B. Levine. In
the 1990s, the SEC and federal prosecutors continued to pursue insider trading investigations
and prosecutions aggressively. However, unlike the prosecutions of the 1980s, the defendants
in recent insider trading cases tend to be corporate executives and directors, as well as their
neighbors, friends, relatives, lawyers, doctors, and consultants. "Today, even as regulators
keep a sharp eye on Wall Street, most of the action has been on Main Street." Insider Trading,
Bus. WK., Dec. 12, 1994, at 70. Thus, "insider trading has gone Middle American." Id.
67. See Mike Milken's Days in Court are Over, BUS.WK., Apr. 1, 1991, at 68. "The SEC
has never wholly abandoned the parity of information theory, but rather has based its actions
on the egregious facts of numerous cases, public outrage concerning these cases, and what-
ever theories the Supreme Court appeared to permit." Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading
on Confidential Information-A Breach in Search of a Duty, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 106
(1998). "Regardless, with respect to the insider trading scandals of the 1980s involving Den-
nis Levine, Ivan Boesky, Michael Milken, and numerous other traders, theory hardly mattered
in prosecuting and settling cases and persuading Congress to increase the penalties for trading
on insider information." Id. During these scandals the ex-chairman of the SEC, John Shad,
spoke about the ban on insider trading:
Countries with broad public ownership of securities generally enjoy the greatest
economic and political stability. Insider trading benefits the few at the expense of
the many. It impugns the integrity of the securities markets. It is hardly fair to pit
the investing public against those who have access to inside information. It is and
should be illegal.
Id.
68. See Robert Maxwell, Lesson From Maxwell, ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 1991, at 16.
69. See Balancing Act: Insider Dealing, ECONOMIST, May 22, 1993, at 84 (stating that
the SEC leads the world in insider trading prosecutions with an average of 30-40 cases a
year).
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B. The EU's Response to Insider Trading
Unlike the United States, where insider trading is regulated under a gen-
eral anti-fraud provision, the EU has chosen to enact specific prohibitions to
curtail this practice.7" In 1986, only three of the EU's twelve member states
forbade insider dealing.' Indeed, until recently, insider trading was consid-
ered a valid part of business practice in Europe." As the EU begins to re-
move obstacles to mergers and acquisitions, and as European companies rely
more heavily on the market for capital, the potential harm to be wrought by
improper use of inside information continues to rise." Consequently, fear of
disruption to their smooth functioning stock exchanges has prompted many
Europeans to change their perception of insider trading."' The resulting mo-
mentum for change, propelled in part by a slew of European insider trading
scandals in the 1980s," led to the EU's adoption in 1989 of Council Direc-
tive 89/592: Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing."6
1. Evolution of the European Union's Insider Trading Directive
The Commission of the European Union (EU Commission), the legisla-
tive body responsible for the initiation of directives within the EU, originally
hoped to regulate insider trading by adopting the European Code of Con-
duct.77 Although the European Code of Conduct received a lukewarm recep-
tion from member states, it provided a blueprint for the EU Commission's
working party, which first met in 1976, to discuss the implementation of le-
gally binding insider trading rules through an EU directive.'8 Over the oppo-
sition of several member states, especially Germany, the EU Commission
created a draft directive in 1987. 7 It subsequently passed a slightly modified
70. See Sulger, supra note 8, at 221-22. One of the EU's main objectives has been to in-
crease free trade among the EU countries including securities transactions. Over the last dec-
ade the EU has created numerous increasingly detailed directives in furtherance of complete
harmonization of securities regulations. See id. Among the most significant are: 1) the Admis-
sions Directive; 2) the Interim Reports Directive; and 3) the Listing Particulars Directive. See
id. at 224.
71. Denmark, France, and the United Kingdom. See Leacock, supra note 1, at 54.
72. See generally Manning Gilbert Warren III, The European Union's Investment Ser-
vices Directive, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 181 (1994).
73. See generally Raffaello Fomasier, The Directive on Insider Dealing, 13 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 149 (1990).
74. See id.
75. See, e.g., Storming of the Bourse, EcONOMIST, July 22, 1989, at 68.
76. See EU Directive, supra note 6.
77. See Leacock, supra note 1, at 71-72; Daniel James Standen, Insider Trading Reforms
Sweep Across Germany: Bracing for the Cold Winds of Change, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 177,
184-85 (1995).
78. See Leacock, supra note 1, at 72.
79. See Standen, supra note 77, at 177.
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version in 1988, which the EU Parliament approved on October 11, 1989.'0
Although the EU Commission ignored the European Parliament's pleas for
stiffer sanctions, it yielded to British criticism by expanding the definition of
insiders, lessening tippee liability, and increasing the powers of regulatory
agencies in the member states.'
2. The Content of the Insider Trading Directive
Like United States securities laws, the objective of the EU Directive is
public disclosure of market-sensitive information." However, in contrast to
its United States counterpart, the EU Directive does not focus on the fiduci-
ary relationship between the insider and the company. 3 Rather, it focuses on
possession of inside information and the relationship of the insider to all
other market actors.84
a. Inside Information
Article 1 of the EU Directive defines inside information as:
[I]nformation which has not been made public of a precise nature relating
to one or several issuers of transferable securities or to one or several
transferable securities, which, if it were made public, would be likely to
have significant effect on the price of the securities in question.8
The inclusion of the "has not been made public" 6 language encourages the
disclosure of price-sensitive information.
b. Insiders
Articles 2 and 4 of the EU Directive distinguish between primary and
secondary insiders. In addition to standard company insiders, the primary in-
sider category includes shareholders of the company and those who have ac-
cess to inside information by virtue of their professional duties. Secondary
80. See Fomasier, supra note 73, at 152.
81. See KOLE& D'AMATO, supra note 7, at 126.
82. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Defining Illegal Insider Trading-Lessons From the Euro-
pean Community Directive on Insider Trading, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231, 237-38
(1992).
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. EU Directive, supra note 6, art. 1(2).
86. Id.
87. Article 2(1) of the EU Directive states that each member state shall prohibit any per-
son (inside trader) who:
by virtue of his membership of the administrative, management or supervisory
bodies of the issuer, by virtue of his holding in the capital of the issuer, or because
he has access to such information by virtue of the exercise of his employment, pro-
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insiders are those who obtain inside information from primary insiders."8
This differentiation corresponds roughly to the tipper/tippee insider trader
distinction in the United States securities system. 9 However, an important
difference from United States law, is that the primary insider (tipper) re-
ferred to in the EU Directive, does not necessarily have a fiduciary relation-
ship with the company. Accordingly, the printer who was out of the reach of
Rule 10b-5 in Chiarella, is treated as an insider under the EU Directive."
c. Prohibited Practices
Although the actions of primary and secondary insiders are regulated
differently under the EU Directive, both types of insiders are barred from us-
ing nonpublic information to buy or sell securities, either for their own ac-
counts or for the accounts of others.9 However, to be liable, the insider must
act "with full knowledge of the facts,"' mere negligence is not enough. Sim-
ply stated, insiders must have known what they were doing. Although a pre-
cise definition of scienter has not been articulated in the United States, it is
well settled that the defendant must at least have had an awareness of the
relevant facts.93 The EU Directive also prohibits primary insiders from dis-
closing inside information to third parties, and from recommending or pro-
curing securities for a third party based on inside information. 4 This prohibi-
tion creates a comprehensive restriction on tipping.
fession or duties, possesses inside information from taking advantage of that in-
formation with full knowledge of the facts by acquiring or disposing of for his own
account or for the account of a third party, either directly or indirectly, transferable
securities of the issuer or issuers to which that information relates.
EU Directive, supra note 6, art. 2(1).
88. See id. art. 4.
89. See id.
90. See 445 U.S. at 235-36.
91. See supra text accompanying note 87. Article 4 of the EU Directive imposes prohibi-
tions on secondary insiders. See EU Directive, supra note 6, art. 4.
92. See supra text accompanying note 87.
93. Similarly, the courts in the United States have interpreted the language of Section
10(b) of the SEA of 1934 to contain a scienter requirement. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976) (stating that "[w]hen a statute speaks so specifically in terms of ma-
nipulation and deception, and of implementing devices and contrivances the commonly un-
derstood terminology of intentional wrongdoing and when its history reflects no more expan-
sive intent, we are quite unwilling to extend the scope of the statute to negligent conduct.").
94. Article 3 of the EU Directive prohibits primary insiders from:
(a) disclosing that inside information to any third party unless such disclo-
sure is made in the normal course of the exercise of his employment, profes-
sion or duties;
(b) recommending or procuring a third party, on the basis of that inside in-
formation to acquire or dispose of transferable securities admitted to trading
on its securities markets as referred to in Article 1(2) in fine.
EU Directive, supra note 6, art. 3.
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Primary insiders are barred from recommending stocks, even if they do
not reveal the inside information on which their tips are based." However,
Article 3 of the EU Directive does contain an exception to this prohibition.
Disclosures made in the ordinary course of the insider's employment or in
the execution of his or her professional duties are not prohibited." This ex-
ception permits the essential flow of information between market profes-
sionals such as banks, investment houses, law firms, and their corporate cli-
ents. It also embodies the United States' notion that to be guilty of insider
trading, the insider must derive some sort of "pecuniary gain.
' 97
Secondary insiders are regulated less strictly under the EU Directive.
Pursuant to Article 4 of the EU Directive, they are prohibited from engaging
in Article 2 transactions, namely trading in securities based on inside infor-
mation.98 Therefore, tippees are not prohibited from continuing the chain of
information by engaging in tipping as long as they do not trade based on the
information obtained. However, because primary insiders are barred from
tipping, there is a gap in the EU Directive that cannot be fully explained.
According to one theory, by allowing tippees to pass on information, the EU
Directive allows for a free flow of information that will eventually purge in-
side information of its "inside" character."
d. Enforcement
The EU Directive does not directly regulate insider trading, but instead
relies on each member state to achieve this goal through the transformation
of their national laws."' Specifically, the EU Directive mandates that mem-
ber states punish Article 2 insiders for violations committed either 1) within
the territorial boundaries of the member states; or 2) committed outside these
boundaries and "carried out" in securities markets in one of the member
states.' To ensure the enforcement of these measures, the EU Directive re-
quires member states to designate authorities responsible for the proper ap-
plication of its prohibitions.Y The designated authorities must be provided
95. See id. art. 3(b).
96. See id. art. 3(a).
97. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
98. Article 4 of the EU Directive provides that:
Each Member State shall also impose the prohibition provided for in Article 2 on
any person other than those referred to in that Article who with full knowledge of
the facts possess insider information, the direct or indirect source of which could
not be other than a person referred to in Article 2.
EU Directive, supra note 6, art. 4.
99. See id.
100. Article 14(l) of the EU Directive requires member states to take the "measures nec-
essary to comply with" the directive by June 1, 1992. Id.
101. See id. art. 5.
102. See id. art. 8.
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with "all supervisory and investigatory powers that are necessary for the ex-
ercise of their functions."'0 3 However, the EU Directive significantly fails to
impose criminal penalties for violations"° or to create a central EU agency to
oversee uniform compliance by the member states.
3. Effectiveness of the Council Directive
The EU Directive's effectiveness is tested by its ability to reshape the
permissive attitudes toward insider trading that have been ingrained through
European business practice. 5 However, because most member states have
only recently changed their laws, and are still struggling to create agencies to
supervise the new regulations, the results of this test are inconclusive."
Nevertheless, it is foreseeable that in the absence of criminal sanctions or
very serious civil penalties, the EU Directive may fail to make insider trad-
ing either as prosecuted, or as stigmatized an offense in the EU, as it is in the
United States. Therefore, there is the danger that the EU Directive and its
corresponding national laws will convey the false impression of a compre-
hensively regulated market-place, 7 thereby lulling investors into a false
sense of security.' 8
In its defense, it can be argued that the EU Directive merely attempts to
avoid the pitfalls of over-regulation through compromise and balance. Cer-
tainly, the separate regulations regarding tipping rules for primary and sec-
ondary insiders suggest the drafters' desire to avoid an overly broad prohibi-
tion. Although the curbing of insider trading is essential to the smooth
functioning of European stock exchanges, the regulations must also allow
enough room for professionals involved with the markets to do their jobs ef-
fectively, unimpeded by the constraints of legislative overreaching."°
Regardless of the disagreement over the lengths to which the EU Com-
mission reached,"' the fact remains that the EU Directive provides a rela-
tively clear legal foundation for the prohibition of insider trading throughout
the European community."' Furthermore, by furnishing clear definitions of
inside information, insiders, and prohibited transactions, the EU Directive
provides a model for the member states. Finally, by focusing on the posses-
103. Id.
104. The EU Directive leaves the choice of type of penalty up to each member state. See
id. art. 13.
105. See Sulger, supra note 8, at 224.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 228.
108. See id. at 229.
109. See generally Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (recognizing the impor-
tance of keeping certain information pertaining to merger negotiations confidential).
110. See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 82, at 237-38 (asserting that "[s]trict prohibitions
against insiders who trade, coupled with an effective enforcement program, are adequate
weapons against" insider trading).
111. See Sulger, supra note 8, at 228.
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sion of inside information rather than on the breach of a fiduciary duty, the
EU Directive is comprehensive enough to prevent more remote inside trad-
ers from slipping through the cracks in the system."'
Nonetheless, the EU Directive has room for improvement, particularly
with regard to penalties and secondary insider liability."' Therefore, the
challenge for the EU member states is to buttress the EU Directive's provi-
sions to make insider trading violations something more than forgivable in-
discretions."4
II. LIMITATIONS ON THE HARMONIZATION BETWEEN UNITED STATES-
EUROPEAN INSIDER TRADING LAWS FROM A UNITED STATES
INVESTOR'S PERSPECTIVE
From a United States investor's perspective, the EU Directive is not an
efficient regulatory tool because it fails to inspire a strong sense of confi-
dence or motivation to channel money into the-European market." The ex-
planation for this lies with three existing concerns. First, the United States is
not inclined to ease up on securities regulations. However, with the rapid ad-
vancement of technology, globalization of securities markets is inevitable
and the United States is now facing stiffer competition."6 The United States
can no longer rely on its place of dominance in this rapidly changing world
of finance."7 Second, there is a common sense recognition in the United
States and in the EU, of the necessity in regulating insider trading more effi-
ciently."8 However, the dilemma of harmonizing the practical aspects of this
recognition from the perspective of two different continents lies primarily in
agreeing upon the labels which should attach to the complexities of insider
trading and its consequences. Finally, closely linked to the dilemma of defi-
nition, is how, and particularly why, these definitional differences exist. In
part, this may be explained by the distinctions in legal culture and tradition
between the United States and EU countries.'' 9
A. Difficulties in Definitional Agreement and Extent of Applicability
Difficulties exist in defining standards in the area of insider trading and
the extent of these definitions in the international arena of securities regula-
112. For example, the printer in Chiarella and the broker in Chestman would both be
liable under the EU Directive as primary insiders. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 224 (1980); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 552 (2d. Cir. 1991).
113. See Sulger, supra note 8, at 230-32.
114. See id.
115. See Uri Geiger, The Case for the Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules in
the Global Market, 1997 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 241, 288-95 (1997).
116. See id. at 247-54.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 257-72.
119. See Sulger, supra note 8, at 238-40.
1999]
17
Hostetter: Turning Insider Trading Inside Out in the European Union
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1999
192 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30
tion. Although United States securities markets are regulated more heavily
than most others, even slight variations from the United States model can
have a significant effect on the applicability of insider trading laws." In ad-
dition, national philosophies as well as a country's allocation of resources to
combat prohibitive conduct in securities transactions, determine the extent to
which violations of securities laws, specifically insider trading activities, are
sanctioned in individual nations.' The following is a review of the central
aspects and differences of insider trading regulations in the United States
and Europe.
1. Criminal or Civil Liability
Generally, statutes which include civil liability require lesser standards
of proof than those that impose criminal liability.' Therefore, countries that
enact civil sanctions against insider trading are more successful in effec-
tively punishing violators than those that impose only criminal sanctions.'23
United States regulations are unique in that they developed predominantly
from a general criminal anti-fraud statute.' 4 Today, however, violators in the
United States are subject to both criminal and civil penalties. 25 Likewise, the
United Kingdom, France, and Denmark began their regulation of securities
transactions by criminalizing insider trading. 6 However, only the United
Kingdom has followed the United States in imposing civil liability as well.'27
The EU Directive fails to establish any uniform sanctions for the member
states.'28 Pursuant to the aforementioned French and Danish prohibitions, the
agency charged with prosecuting insider trading offenses in these countries
is faced with the difficult burden of establishing each element of a criminal
offense before sanctions are available.'29 This requirement severely hampers
120. See id.
121. See id. at 238-39.
122. See Dawes, supra note 20.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See generally Paul Vizcarrondo, Jr. & Andrew C. Houston, Liabilities Under Sec-
tions 11, 12, 15 and 17 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Sections 10, 18 and 20 of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 1073 PLIICoRP. I 11 (1998).
126. See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Transnational Takeover Talk-Regulations Relat-
ing to Tender Offers and Insider Trading in the United States, The United Kingdom, Ger-
many, and Australia, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1133 (1998); Michael D. Mann et al., Developments
in International Securities Law Enforcement and Regulation, 845 PLI/CORP. 9 (1994).
127. See Gerald A. Polcari, A Comparative Analysis of Insider Trading Laws, 13
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 167, 176 (1989) (comparing insider trading laws from the United
States, United Kingdom, Germany and Australia).
128. See generally Sandra K. Miller, Piercing the Corporate Veil Among Affiliated Com-
panies in the European Community and in the United States: A Comparative Analysis of
United States, German and U.K. Veilpiercing Approaches, 36 AM. Bus. L.J. 73 (1998); Mary
Jane Dundas et al., The Transposal Processes of the EC Directives and the United States Uni-
form Codes: A Comparative Analysis, 21 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 43 (1998).
129. See Doty, supra note 15, at S79-84.
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the effectiveness of these regulations. 3 ' Uniform establishment of civil li-
ability for insider trading activity would assist the international enforcement
of insider trading laws in these nations.'
2. "Insiders"
Lack of a specific definition for "insiders" is another element that has a
substantial impact on the effectiveness of insider trading laws.' A provision
without a general framework for defining "insiders" may be too broad to
provide effective regulation because enforcers may be reluctant to subject
anyone to liability.'33 Conversely, an overly strict definition of "insiders"
may impede enforcement efforts by making it difficult to fit potential viola-
tors into the narrow classification required under the law.'"
The definition of "insiders" is not precisely defined in the United
States. 3 ' However, rather than impeding enforcement of insider trading, the
lack of a strict definition has instead permitted a broad application of liabil-
ity for insider trading.'36 Currently, under United States law, an insider must,
at a minimum, have a fiduciary duty to either disclose material, nonpublic
information, or refrain from trading.'37 This fiduciary duty has also been ex-
tended to "temporary insiders" and tippees." The EU Directive also adopts a
moderate definition, including both fiduciaries and tippees,"' to avoid either
a very limited or an over-broad construction.' ° By requiring an issuer to dis-
close material information, the intent of the EU Directive is to reduce the
frequency of insider trading by regulating factors contributing to the circum-
stances affording personal gain on nonpublic information. 4'
Even though the EU Directive creates a base line standard to be fol-
lowed by member states, the EU Directive's definition of "insiders" does lit-
tle to instill a sense of confident investment practices by United States inves-
130. See id.
131. See Geiger, supra note 115, at 316-17.
132. See Georgakopoulos, supra note 23, at 49.
133. See id.
134. See Hazen, supra note 82. By providing an express definition of insider trading, the
U.K. has created a more restrictive application of the law. See id.
135. See HAMILTON, supra note 3, at 894-95.
136. See id. The absence of a definition for insider trading has led to expansive interpre-
tation by the courts of impermissible insider trading conduct that has enabled the SEC to suc-
cessfully prosecute an increasing number of violator. See id.
137. See id. at 753.
138. See, e.g., State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 592 F. Supp. 592, 594
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that tippee liability requires that the tippee have "knowledge of
each element, including the personal benefit, of the tipper's breach."). There is also a possibil-
ity that this common-law definition of insiders extends to those who misappropriate this in-
formation. See id.
139. See Hazen, supra note 82.
140. See Geiger, supra note 115, at 272.
141. See Hazen, supra note 82, at 237-38.
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tors in the EU market."12 Although the EU Directive is an initial step in estab-
lishing a unified set of securities regulations, it has not gone far enough.' 3
Specifically, the EU Directive creates no more than a minimum standard for
securities transactions regulatory compliance.'" Thus, after a EU country
meets the minimal standard set out by the EU Directive, it may wish to ex-
pand its insider trading rules to include more detail, scope and impact.' Al-
though the evolution of the EU has been towards unification in a legal, po-
litical and social sense,'" the evolution of securities regulations in the EU,
including insider trading, continue to exist on a multi-tiered plane.'7 For a
United States investors the problem consists in distinguishing what should
be considered unified and all inclusive, and what must be viewed as discrete
units within a larger union." '8 Consequently, United States investors will face
varying levels of deterrence in each member state."9 In sum, the absence of
uniform definitions among the EU countries significantly undermines the
EU Directive's original goal of standardizing insider trading prohibitions.
On its face, the EU Directive appears extensive in scope." Though,
some argue that the EU Directive's lines have been relatively well estab-
lished, the exact location of those lines is far from clear." For example,
unlike the United States' definition for "insiders," it is clear that the EU Di-
rective fails to state exactly who may, or may not be considered an "insider."
Arguably, a vague definition of "insiders" could reach more broadly to those
who would otherwise merely be border-line cases. Ultimately however, this
factor remains an unknown to United States investors who will likely feel
less comfortable investing in a market based on vague definitions.
Finally, the EU Directive regulates the activities of a cadre of personnel,
encompassing more than just a few persons closely associated with a com-
pany, and arguably even reaches "tippees."" However, the EU Directive
does not expressly prohibit tippees from simply passing insider information
on to subsequent tippees."3 Similar to the United States, true insiders are
142. See Joseph F. Jacob, Note, The Impact of the Euro on the United States Equity Mar-
kets, 13 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 399, 400-05 (1998); Ruggiero, supra note 1, at 192;
Leacock, supra note 1, at 51.
143. See Sulger, supra note 8, at 240.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See KOLE & D'AMATO, supra note 7, at 103, 285. See generally Hugo Paemen, The
European Union in International Affairs: Recent Developments, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S 136
(1999) (describing how one of the main objectives of the EU is the free movement of goods,
persons, services, and capital between its member states' borders).
147. See Sulger, supra note 8, at 238-39.
148. See generally Dundas, supra note 128.
149. See id.
150. See Sulger, supra note 8, at 224.
151. See Hazen, supra note 82, at 237.
152. See, e.g., Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (defining "tippees"
as "persons given information by insiders in breach of trust.").
153. See supra text accompanying note 94.
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prohibited from trading on inside information.'"" However, a major differ-
ence exists concerning the reach of the insider trading definition between the
EU countries and the United States. One who overhears information, know-
ing it to be material, and nonpublic would be considered a secondary insider
and thus such a person would be a remote tippee. Unlike regulations in the
United States, the EU Directive focuses on the source of information rather
than on whether that source breached an obligation by passing on informa-
tion.'5
3. "Inside Information"
Like the definition of "insiders," statutory definitions of inside informa-
tion can have a profound effect on the applicability and effectiveness of in-
sider trading regulations. United States laws fail to include a specific defini-
tion of inside information. Specifically, the definition of inside information
was left out of Rule 10b-5." 6 However, later provisions establish that insider
information consists of "material, nonpublic information."'57 This construc-
tion of inside information provides an adequate framework for imposing li-
ability, but remains broad enough to allow wide application. On the other
hand, the EU Directive includes a corresponding definition of inside infor-
mation, defining it as nonpublic information that would have significant im-
pact on the price of the security if it were made public.' 8
4. Class of Securities Regulated
By limiting the scope of insider trading statutes to securities that are
traded on a formal organized exchange, the efficiency of such statutes are
seriously undermined and less efficient.'59 United States regulations are ap-
plicable to securities traded both on or off an exchange,'" and the EU Direc-
tive regulations apply to the trading of both listed securities and off-market
transactions."' With off-market trading activity increasing, application of in-
sider trading regulations to informal exchanges also becomes more impor-
154. See Hazen, supra note 82, at 237-38.
155. See id. at 238.
156. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
157. See TSC Industries Inc., 426 U.S. at 438 (defining materially as information regard-
ing a security that a reasonable investor would consider important).
158. See Steven R. Salbu, Regulation of Insider Trading in a Global Marketplace: A
Uniform Statutory Approach, 66 TUL. L. REV. 837, 844-47 (1992); Fornasier, supra note 73.
159. The United Kingdom's prohibition of off-market trading is the primary reason it is
viewed as having the most comprehensive insider trading regulations of the EU member
states. France and Denmark, for example, each place this restriction on the application of their
laws. See Ruggiero, supra note 1.
160. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994).
161. See Robert W. Helm & David A. Vaughan, Creating, Managing and Distributing
Offshore Investment Products: A Legal Perspective, 1035 PLI/CoRP. 583, 589-91 (1998).
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5. Enforcement of Regulations
The creation of more severe insider trading regulations without an un-
derlying dedication to the enforcement of these provisions, is insufficient to
constitute a credible attack on insider trading. Whatever the elements of sub-
stantive insider trading regulations, these laws will only be effective if they
are enforced by national governments or regulatory agencies. A country's
national philosophy regarding insider trading will also play a substantial role
in the extent to which illegal trading regulations are enforced."
United States insider trading laws, and the EU Directive, share several
structural similarities. However, in contrast to the widespread application of
the United States insider trading laws, only limited action has been taken
pursuant to the EU Directive. In part, this may be explained by the fact that,
until very recently, several European countries have rarely sanctioned insider
trading activity.'63 Even with the newly enacted changes in EU law, this un-
derlying philosophy may remain an obstacle to the effective enforcement of
illegal trading. Not until EU countries make insider trading regulation a na-
tional priority, and change their enforcement policies to reflect this commit-
ment, will this activity be successfully deterred.
Jurisdictional barriers often inhibit the enforcement efforts of regulatory
authorities." This is evidenced by the growing number of insider trading
cases which involve extraterritorial elements.65 Currently, neither the United
States nor the EU appear to be able to harmonize the exact terminology of
insider trading regulations. Definitional disharmony has lead to another
prevalent problem in determining whose definitions should apply to any in-
ternational scheme of securities regulation. This dilemma is commonly re-
ferred to as the "race to the bottom.' '
162. See generally Lynda M. Ruiz, European Community Directive on Insider Dealing:
A Model For Effective Enforcement of Prohibitions on Insider Trading in International Secu-
rities Markets, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 217 (1995).
163. See EU Directive, supra note 6. The EU Directive was adopted in 1989. See id.
164. See id. In the past, French and British insider trading investigations have been ham-
pered by the alleged violator's use of foreign banks for the trading activity. See id.
165. See Mann et al., supra note 126, at 47. This is the greatest obstacle faced by the
SEC in its enforcement efforts. See id.
166. See David Charny, Competition Among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate
Law Rules: An American Perspective on the "Race to the Bottom" in the European Commu-
nities, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 423 (1991) (discussing rules of incorporation in EU member
states). The phrase "a race to the bottom," in the sense of a legislative trend toward the lowest
common denominator, has been coined in the context of state competition for corporate char-
ters in the United States. See id. at 423.
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B. Race to the Bottom?
During most of the 1980s, academic theoretical analyses of securities
regulation generally dealt with reforms in the domestic disclosure regime.
Discussion of the international aspects of securities regulation began in ear-
nest only after the SEC issued its 1987 report on the internalization of
securities markets.' 6 The bulk of academic literature", considers regulatory
diversity a component of international regulatory competition, with the
familiar debate over the race to the bottom's (or top) now taking place in the
international arena. In this respect, it is worth noting that no matter where
such a race may be heading, the important point is that race dynamics could
lead to convergence either at the top, or the bottom, among the racing juris-
dictions.7
Several commentators reason that because the United States is "where
the money is," others should adapt to the rules of securities markets in the
United States, thereby eliminating the need for the SEC to change current
rules.' However, this reasoning over-simplifies the issue of securities regu-
lation. First, a majority of United States securities laws were written at a
167. See id.
168. See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 82, at 263; Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a
Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498 (1997); Stephen J.
Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Securities Law,
17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 207 (1996); Gunnar Schuster, Extraterritoriality of Securities
Laws: An Economic Analysis of Jurisdictional Conflicts, 26 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 165
(1994) (presenting an economic analysis of jurisdictional conflicts).
169. See Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35
STAN. L. REV. 857, 857-60 (1983). See generally Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory
Competition, Externalization, and Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47 (1993); Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in
Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992).
170. See Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, A New Approach to the Regulation of
Trading Across Securities Markets, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1411, 1466 (1995). The "race to the
bottom" is a situation where markets compete by lowering standards in the hope that lower
and more lenient standards will attract more trading. See id. at 1466 n. 142. As a result, the
general level of standards across markets keeps declining, and markets continue to lower their
standards. A recent example of a race to the bottom was the relaxation of rules by the Paris
Bourse (the French securities exchange market) in September of 1994. See id. This relaxation
was done as an effort to regain part of the trading volume in French stocks that had migrated
to London's securities market. On the Paris Bourse's trading system, where orders are exe-
cuted according to pure price and time priorities, block trades were usually executed at a price
within the bid-ask spread. See id. If executed at a price outside the spread, they had to satisfy
all other orders already on the book with higher priority. This practice preserved priority rules
and protected smaller investors. Traders, however, could circumvent these rules by trading
French stocks on SEAQ in London, where rules were less strict. See id. The Bourse, trying to
regain trading from London, relaxed its rules to allow both block trading outside the bid-ask
spread and a substantial delay in the disclosure of block transactions. See id.
171. See, e.g., James R. Silkenat, Overview of United States Securities Markets and For-
eign Issuers, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. S4 (1994) (explaining that foreign markets have been
unable to handle the capital needs created by privatization and traditional corporate finance
needs, and as a result, many companies have been driven to United States markets).
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time when the United States securities market existed, more or less, in isola-
tion.172 The internalization of the world's securities market has created sig-
nificant competition for the United States securities market.' The new chal-
lenge to the SEC exists in balancing the protection of the investor with its
responsibility to maintain the competitive position of the United States in the
securities market."" Second, attracting foreign issuers to the United States
regulated market is very important.' More activity in the United States from
abroad will create more jobs and conversion fees for the United States finan-
cial industry. 76 Moreover, this will enhance the likelihood that the United
States will influence the regulation of securities markets in other areas of the
world.7' Specifically, the International Organization of Securities Commis-
sions (IOSCO),"' and the International Accounting Standards Commission
(IASC),79 are proof that the SEC realizes there is a real element of competi-
tion which faces the United States today.180
172. See generally Michael G. Dailey, Preemption of State Court Class Action Claims
for Securities Fraud: Should Federal Law Trump?, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 587 (1999).
173. See Geiger, supra note 115, at 258-59; see also Michael D. Mann et al., Develop-
ments in International Securities Law Enforcement and Regulation, 29 INT'L LAW. 729, 730
(1995). The "internationalization of the world's securities markets is no longer a new phe-
nomenon" due to advances in computer and telecommunications technology. Id. It is today
possible to participate in a country's securities markets from almost anywhere in the world.
See id. Because foreign markets are now easily accessible, this has helped to expand the in-
vestor base and offers the investor more markets to chose from. Just as electronic trading sys-
tems seek to become active participants in the United States markets, their United States
counterparts seek access to foreign markets. See id.
174. See, e.g., Bevis Longstreth, A Look at the SEC's Adaptation to Global Market
Pressures, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 319 (1995) (describing the SEC's accommodations
to internalization).
175. See Geiger, supra note 115, at 265-70.
176. See id.
177. See generally Longstreth, supra note 174.
178. The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) is a private or-
ganization encompassing representatives of securities regulators from over 100 countries, in-
cluding the regulatory agencies of all the major financial centers. The IOSCO serves as the
principal forum for the study and discussion of international securities regulation. See Divi-
sion of Corporation Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission, Current Issues and
Rulemaking Projects, 1138 PLI/CORP. 71, 116-18 (1999).
The SEC is involved in the process of developing international disclosure and accounting
standards within the framework of the IOSCO. See id.
179. See id. at 117. The International Accounting Standards Commissions (IASC) is
striving to complete a core set of international accounting standards for which the SEC has
expressed its full endorsement. See id.
180. The argument has also been made that the United States securities market regula-
tions are too strict and that this will deter foreign issuers from listing in the United States,
thereby depriving United States investors of lucrative investment opportunities. See generally
Amir N. Licht, International Diversity in Securities Regulation: Roadblocks on the Way to
Convergence, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 227 (1998); James D. Cox, Regulatory Competition in
Securities Markets: An Approach for Reconciling Japanese and United States Disclosure Phi-
losophies, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 149 (1993) (discussing that as the globaliza-
tion of securities markets accelerates, international cooperation in securities regulation grows
in importance for regulators, lawyers, and practitioners). The outcome is a composite legal
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Recently, in the United States, the SEC has taken several steps to reduce
the disclosure requirements applicable to foreign issuers."' For example, for-
eign issuers that offer securities in the United States do not have to prepare
their financial statements in accordance with the United States Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).'" Instead, foreign issuers may
chose to use any comprehensive body of accounting principles. Also, since
1994, first time foreign registrants have been required to reconcile only the
last two years of their financial statements.' 3 Furthermore, foreign issuers
are required to disclose only limited information on the compensation of
both directors and officers.' Another important step the SEC has taken with
regard to international securities disclosure was the adoption of the Multi-
jurisdictional Disclosure System (MJDS).' 5
The SEC implemented additional rules which have had a significant im-
pact on the internationalization of the United States securities market. These
rules are evidence that the "race to the bottom" has already commenced.
However, it is quite possible that what the SEC is realizing in this globaliz-
ing market, is that regulations must not rigidly follow a pattern of United
States dominance. In particular, Regulation S 6 proves the new and neces-
sary flexibility which will enable efficient financial exchange in interna-
tional securities markets. ' Regulation S limits the extraterritorial application
of the Act of 1933' by eliminating the registration requirements for many
system in which national regimes may either enhance or erode the regulatory objectives of the
component regimes. See generally Manning Gilbert Warren III, Global Harmonization of Se-
curities Laws: The Achievement of the European Communities, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 185
(1990). To effectively enforce a country's securities regulation regime domestically, regula-
tors increasingly need cooperation from their foreign counterparts. See id. Generally coopera-
tion among securities regulators is thus warranted for reasons that are beyond the standard
argument for curbing a regulatory race for the bottom. See id.
181. See Longstreth, supra note 174, at 319 (detailed description of the SEC's accom-
modations to internalization).
182. 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01(a)(2) (1997).
183. See Geiger, supra note 115, at 317.
184. See id. at 288-90.
185. See Matthew F. Gorra, On-Line Trading and United States Securities Policy:
Evaluating the SEC's Role in International Securities Regulation, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 209,
236 (1998). Based on a reciprocity approach, the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System
(MJDS) allows Canadian and United States issuers to satisfy each other's registration and dis-
closure requirements by complying with their own domestic requirements. See id.
186. See generally JAMEs D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND
MATERIALS 324-32 (2d ed. 1997), The SEC has recently taken steps to lessen the burden of
overseas investment. See id. Regulation S, which embodies Rules 901-904, is one of these
steps which provides a safe harbor for offshore distributions and resales of unregistered secu-
rities of United States and foreign issuers. See id
187. See id. Regulation S outlines two main safe harbors for offshore transactions con-
sidered to be "without the United States." These are issuer offerings (Rule 903) and resales
(Rule 904). See id. Regulation S defines an offshore transactions as merely not involving "di-
rected selling efforts" in the United States See id. Relative to most of the other SEC provi-
sions, Regulation S is amorphous and intentionally broad. See id.
188. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1997).
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offshore transactions. '"Moreoyer, Regulation S provides greater predictabil-
ity with regard to the application of United States securities laws to offshore
offerings.
C. International Enforcement of Insider Trading Laws
Technological advances have enabled the trading of United States secu-
rities to take place outside of the country." As a result, much of today's ille-
gal trading of United States securities is facilitated by the use of foreign bro-
kers and institutions. 9' For example, both Dennis Levine and Ivan Boesky
utilized foreign bank accounts to aid their illegal trading."
As discussed, United States insider trading law is by far the most com-
prehensive in the world. Indeed, many countries have yet to impose insider
trading laws at all. Absent the enactment of uniform prohibitions of this ac-
tivity worldwide, 93 some traders will take advantage of the discrepancies by
trading outside of nations imposing harsh penalties."'9 Therefore, despite ex-
isting jurisdictional and extraterritorial discovery limitations, international
application of United States insider trading laws is essential to maintaining
control over illegal insider trading activity.
1. Jurisdictional Barriers to International Enforcement
The United States Constitution requires that minimum standards be met
before a United States federal court can obtain personal jurisdiction over an
individual, and subject matter jurisdiction over a controversy. Acquisition of
personal jurisdiction must meet the standards of due process, 95 and subject
matter jurisdiction will be met if it is authorized by Article III and Con-
gress.1
96
Questions of personal jurisdiction are raised when the SEC attempts to
189. See Jacob, supra note 142, at 400.
190. See Michael Gruson, The Global Securities Market: Introductory Remarks, 1987
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 303, 305-06 (1987). Other factors promoting internationalization of the
securities markets include: domestic economic growth, the volatility of domestic financial
markets, and the impact of national "political and economic philosophies" regarding securities
regulation. Id. at 304-05; Michael D. Mann et al., The Internet: Identifying and Responding to
International Jurisdictional and Regulatory Compliance Issues, 1046 PLI/CoRP. 241, 243-47
(1998).
191. See Lauren D. Rosenthal, Rule 10b-5 and Transnational Bankruptcies: Whose Laws
Should Apply? 61 FORDHAM L. REv. S321, S338-39 (1993).
192. See generally Richard J. Hunter Jr. & Anthony L. Loviscek, Insider Trading Since
Carpenter: The Misappropriation Theory and Beyond, 41 How. L.J. 79 (1997).
193. See Licht, supra note 180. The cost of adopting uniform regulations, in addition to
the varying market structures and philosophies, are major obstacles to the enactment of uni-
form regulations worldwide. See id.
194. See id.
195. See World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980).
196. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
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investigate or prosecute insider trading involving either foreign participants
or foreign witnesses. 9 ' The Supreme Court has held that to obtain personal
jurisdiction over a foreigner, due process requires that it be in keeping with
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'98 This requirement
is satisfied when there has been a finding of sufficient "minimum contacts"
between the foreign subject and the United States'" Thus, if a foreign issuer
has "minimum contacts" with the United States, the court may exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over the issuer. The Court's requirement of "minimum
contacts" will likely be satisfied by any continuous trading of United States
securities, any trading conducted through United States accounts, or even by
a single act that is directly related to the SEC's claim."s
The preamble to the SEA of 1934 states that its provisions "provide for
the regulation of securities exchanges and of over-the-counter markets oper-
ating in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails." '' Based
upon an interpretation of this language, two tests have developed as the basis
to establish subject matter jurisdiction in cases with extraterritorial elements.
These two test are the "conduct" test and the "effects" test.
Pursuant to the "conduct" test, a court examines the location of the ac-
tivities, and will determine whether the activity taking place in the United
States is substantial in relation to the overall conduct.2" The second test util-
ized to assert subject matter jurisdiction is the "effects" test. This test exam-
ines the impact that the activities in question have had in the United States.
Where the effect is significant, subject matter jurisdiction may be ex-
tended. 3 The first case that applied the "effects" test was Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook. " In Schoenbaum, the Second Circuit asserted subject matter ju-
risdiction despite the fact that the conduct occurred outside of the United
States and involved foreign investors. 5 The rationale of the court was that
the trading of United States securities injured United States investors."°
197. See Mann et al., supra note 126.
198. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (quoting Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
199. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291.
200. See, e.g., SEC v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1987) (acquiring personal jurisdic-
tion over Tome, a foreign citizen who traded United States stock through foreign brokers but
had other contacts with the United States unrelated to the trading activity).
201. Hazen, supra note 82, at 524-44.
202. See Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1339 (2d
Cir. 1972). The court held that "abundant misrepresentations" made to a United States citizen
in the United States constituted substantial conduct even where the remainder of the activities
transpired abroad. See id.
203. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 102.
204. 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968).
205. See id. at 206.
206. See id.
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2. Extraterritorial Discovery
Another significant barrier to extraterritorial enforcement of United
States insider trading law surfaces when an SEC subpoena or request for in-
formation, conflicts with foreign secrecy or blocking laws. Some nations
have adopted blocking laws requiring that specified information remain con-
fidential to protect national interests.207 These statutes safeguard national in-
terests, and prohibit private parties from disclosing any information °.2 8 Ap-
plication of these laws can frustrate an attempt by the SEC to gain access to
information that may be vital to an insider trading case.
Faced with foreign secrecy or blocking laws, the SEC may resort to
courts in the United States to compel production of the requested informa-
tion pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2" A court's
decision to grant or deny an order to compel is often based upon considera-
tion of the factors listed in Section 40 of the Restatement (Second) of For-
eign Relations Law of the United States (Restatement of Foreign Rela-
tions). ° In the landmark case of SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana
(BSI),211 the court held that BSI could not use Swiss secrecy laws to avoid
disclosure and application of United States insider trading laws.12 In another
case, the Supreme Court introduced a second balancing test focusing on the
first factor of the Restatement of Foreign Relations.2 " This test merely
weighs the importance of the requested discovery material against the inter-
ests of each nation.2"' The Court developed this test from Section 437(l)(c)
207. See Lee S. Richards, Legal Representation in the International Securities Markets:
Representing Clients in Securities and Exchange Commission, Department of Justice or Self-
Regulatory Organizations Proceedings Involving Foreign Citizens or Foreign Trading, 693
PLI/CoRP. 143, 180-88 (1990).
208. See id. Canada, France, and the United Kingdom are among the nations that have
enacted blocking statutes. Bank secrecy laws make it illegal for a foreign bank to disclose in-
formation about its bank records without the customer's authorization. Secrecy laws may be
waived by individual customers provided that this does not prejudice the rights of third parties
to whom the bank owes a duty of secrecy. See id.
209. See FED. R. Crv. P. 37.
210. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 40 (1965). Focusing on international comity considerations, the criteria under the Restate-
ment include: (a) the national interests of each country; (b) the hardship of inconsistent en-
forcement upon the individual; (c) the extent of the conduct in the foreign nation; (d) the na-
tionality of the individual involved; and (e) the extent to which compliance will be achieved
through enforcement. See id.
211. 92F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
212. Following Banca Della Svizzera Italiana's (BSI) refusal to reveal the names of its
customers, the SEC moved for a motion to compel. BSI argued that the motion should be de-
nied because BSI would be subject to civil and criminal penalties in Switzerland if it made
these disclosures. See id. at 114. In granting the SEC's motion, the court stated that "a foreign
law's prohibition of discovery is not decisive" on this issue. Id.
213. See Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States, 482 U.S. 522
(1987).
214. See id. at 543-44.
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of the Restatement of Foreign Relations but did not state whether the analy-
sis should be exclusive."'
Using a unilateral approach to achieve compliance with United States'
laws, such as court-ordered compliance, is problematic for a number of rea-
sons."1 6 First, an order to compel may be ignored where compliance will sub-
ject a foreign institution to civil and criminal penalties in its own country."7
Furthermore, this unilateral approach is time consuming, expensive, and
strains international relations." 8
3. Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperative Approaches to
International Enforcement
Bilateral and multilateral approaches, consisting primarily of coopera-
tive agreements between the United States and foreign countries, are a far
better method for conducting successful extraterritorial investigations, and
promoting transnational enforcement of insider trading regulations." 9 Coop-
erative agreements have increasingly become the SEC's method of choice
for facilitating international enforcement of insider trading regulations.2
These agreements provide methods for successful extraterritorial discovery
by enabling the SEC to work around foreign secrecy and blocking statutes.2
Furthermore, under these agreements, the SEC comports with notions of in-
ternational comity by promoting cooperative regulatory efforts as opposed to
forced regulation.2
The United States has entered into bilateral treaties regarding mutual le-
gal assistance in criminal matters with several European countries, and the
215. See id. at 544 n.28.
216. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (reversing contempt or-
der against bank for refusal to respond to grand jury subpoena emphasizing that bank had
acted in good faith throughout the proceedings).
217. See id.
218. See generally Michael J. Calhoun, Tension on the High Seas of Transnational Secu-
rities Fraud: Broadening the Scope of United States Jurisdiction, 30 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 679
(1999).
219. See Lee E. Michaels, Disclosure in Global Securities Offerings: Analysis of Juris-
dictional Approaches, Commonality and Reciprocity, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 207, 236 (1999). A
cooperative approach towards international enforcement of insider trading is preferable to
unilateral action because it can better accommodate the different levels of regulatory control
existing worldwide. For example, unilateral pressure to enforce strict insider trading laws in
countries with less-developed regulatory structures could stifle the development of these na-
tions' domestic markets. See id.
220. See Mann et al., supra note 126.
221. See id.
222. See id. The two forms of international cooperative agreements that are used to con-
duct insider trading investigations and prosecutions are (1) mutual legal assistance treaties for
the production of evidence in criminal matters; and (2) memoranda of understanding. See id.
Finally, legislative initiatives promoting international cooperation, in addition to meetings
between national securities regulators, provide the opportunity for international communica-
tion and cooperation regarding worldwide regulation of securities trading. See id.
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SEC has ensured that each of these treaties covers offenses of securities
laws.223 The principal shortcoming of such treaties is their bilateral nature,
which limits their availability to the two named nations.224 A second limita-
tion is the requirement that the subject matter of the request for assistance be
a crime in both nations. This is a significant obstacle to obtaining meaningful
cooperation in insider trading investigations because the United States has
promulgated more developed insider trading laws than other nations. Mutual
legal assistance treaties also tend to have a limited scope, and their bureau-
cratic nature often makes obtaining compliance too time consuming to offer
much help. 5
In an effort to create a less formalized and therefore a more expeditious
method for obtaining assistance in these cases, the SEC has entered into
Memoranda of Understanding ("MOU") with several foreign countries.22
MOUs promote mutual exchange of the information necessary to investigate
violations of insider trading and other securities laws.227 Each party to the
MOU agrees to assist and cooperate with the investigations conducted by the
other.228 Further, MOUs provide for mutual assistance across a wide range of
laws and regulations and expands the forms of assistance the regulators may
provide.229 Unlike a treaty, MOUs are not binding agreements.23 While ad-
mittedly this means that neither party is strictly bound to cooperate, the in-
formal character of the MOU in contrast to the mutual assistance treaties, fa-
cilitates their swift enactment and implementation.23' MOUs also eliminate
the requirement that the subject matter of the investigation be an illegal ac-
tivity in both countries, a characteristic of many of the bilateral treaties.232
Therefore, MOUs are particularly useful when the SEC is investigating ac-
tivity that does not constitute an offense in the foreign nation. And most im-
portant, MOUs often provide broader coverage of securities offenses than do
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See generally Recent Actions Regarding Treaties to Which The United States is a
Party, 27 I.L.M. 571, 574 (1988). In 1982, the United States entered into its first MOU with
Switzerland, creating an official mechanism for requesting and obtaining information needed
in SEC investigations of insider trading. See id. Within the EU, the United States has subse-
quently entered into MOU with the United Kingdom's Department of Trade and Industry; the
Commission des Operations de Bourse of France; the Ministry of Finance of the Netherlands;
and, most recently, with the Director General of Norway's Banking, Insurance, and Securities
Commission. See id. Additionally, on September 25, 1991, the United States and the United
Kingdom entered into a second, more comprehensive MOU. See id.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See Elliot M. Beard, A Critical Analysis of the Effects of Colello v. Second Interna-
tional Securities Law Enforcement Agreements, 7 DuKE J. CoMP. & INT'L L. 271, 272-75
(1996).
231. See id.
232. See id.
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treaties.233
Finally, in addition to international legislation, international organiza-
tions further enable cooperation among national securities regulators. For
example, the IOSCO is continuously working with participating nations to
create legislation facilitating further enactment of bilateral and multinational
cooperative agreements between securities authorities."
D. Cultural Distinctions
At the root of the difficulties facing United States investors in building a
sufficient level of confidence to invest in the European market, is the very
different approach to securities regulation from cultural and ideological per-
spectives.235 The importance of cultural understanding of corporate structure
has been pointed out by several scholars and finance experts. One expert
noted that "[riather than using agency costs or contract theory or judicial
doctrine to explain this or that feature as mitigating or reflecting managerial
deviation from the maximization of shareholders' wealth, we must consider
the role of politics, history, and culture." '236 Securities regulations are affected
a great deal by cultural standards and norms. The cultural factors, coupled
with the diversity of modem industrialized countries, complicates interna-
tional enforcement efforts and suggests that nations are not ready to relin-
quish substantial control over such culture bound regulations.2 37
National sovereignty sentiment and cultural change constitute two pri-
mary components contributing to the differences and complications of har-
monizing insider trading laws between the United States and the EU. Indeed,
these two elements are often intertwined. It is precisely the strong sentiment
of national authority which often resists change in the increasingly overlap-
ping spheres of society, politics, and economy.
In spite of Europe's transformation, the private law of the core member
states remains guarded in the jealous hands of national institutions, and these
institutions are quite conscious of their national character.23 Furthermore, in
spite of the effort to harmonize the "black-letter" law of different legal sys-
tems, and where possible, to bring them into uniformity, the procedural rules
and judicial remedies of each member state retain diverse national features.
Most of the arguments advanced by European national courts and lawyers
against harmonizing private law are doctrinal. They claim that such interfer-
ence breaches the internal doctrinal coherence of civil codes. From this as-
233. See generally Joseph 1. Goldstein et al., Recent SEC Enforcement Developments,
703 PLI/CORP. 389 (1990).
234. See id.
235. See generally Wegen, supra note 11; Nunes et al., supra note 11.
236. James A. Fanto, The Transformation of French Corporate Governance and United
States Institutional Investors, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1, 77 (1995).
237. See generally Sulger, supra note 8, at 237-38.
238. See Licht, supra note 180, at 280.
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pect, securities laws generally cannot claim the same degree of doctrinal so-
phistication and coherence as those of the United States. 39
With the rise of the subsidiarity principle in the EU, and in light of its
forthcoming enlargements, there is a risk that insider trading rules in the EU
will remain substantially ununified and country specific."4 The admission of
more member states (particularly from Eastern Europe) means higher diver-
sity and subsidiarity means more deference to national and local preferences.
The unwillingness to completely override domestic laws and regulations in
the name of harmonizing insider trading laws among the European countries
is reflected and paralleled by the difficulties accompanying the introduction
of the Euro currency. For example, two EU member states, the United King-
dom and Denmark, chose not to participate in the implementation of the
Euro currency for the time being."" The numerous obstacles associated with
a reduction in national authority before the actual implementation of the
Euro currency, clearly indicates the desire of several European countries to
maintain a sense of sovereignty over their own economic markets. However,
the EU member states are increasingly feeling the pressure to resign them-
selves to the role of business advocates instead of clinging to the traditional
and exclusive governmental role."2 Thus, the threat to national sovereignty
constitutes one significant hurdle to harmonization of insider trading rules.
Closely connected to the opinion of national sovereignty is the issue of
cultural change. Alterations in both social and cultural factors influence the
path towards any scheme of securities regulation. 3 With the heightened
sense of securities regulations as represented by the implementation of the
EU Directive, a new financial and corporate psychology will likely surface
in the European financial market.'" However, before any attempt to harmo-
nize securities markets between the United States and the EU succeeds, it
will be necessary for the EU to achieve economic reconciliation from within.
III. HARMONIZING INSIDER TRADING RULES: MUTUAL RECOGNITION
Admittedly, the EU Directive has introduced and harmonized relatively
sophisticated insider trading laws throughout the EU. However, the EU Di-
rective's approach to enforcement and penalties of relegating coercion to in-
dividual member states may fail to provide the hoped for deterrence. 4 Inpart, this is explained by the fact that the EU Directive merely sets out
239. See id. at 229.
240. See Nunes et al., supra note 11.
241. See Bruce C. Bennett, European Capital Markets: How Issuers Have Prepared for
EMU, 1090 PLI/CoRP. 821, 824 (1998).
242. See Samuel Wolff, New Developments in International Securities Regulation, 23
DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 347, 417 (1995).
243. See id. at 598.
244. See id.
245. See discussion supra Part 1.2.d.
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guidelines to be followed. From a United States perspective, this manner of
implementing insider trading regulations falls short of the necessary level of
adherence, which would create the confidence and trust between two other-
wise distinct financial markets. From a theoretical perspective, the concept
of subsidiarity addresses the general need for an approach towards the har-
monization of insider trading rules.2"
In the structure of subsidiarity, a better understanding of each other's
approaches to insider trading coupled with an increased tolerance towards
the existing differences, will likely heighten the incentive of foreign invest-
ment. Subsidiarity, an already familiar concept, may provide some guidance
with respect to understanding and reconciling varying levels of insider trad-
ing regimes. Subsidiarity implies that all actions in social and political life
should be performed by the smallest possible unit.2 ' In the context of the
European community, this approach means that the EU "government" would
do as little as possible, leaving most of the functions to the national, and per-
haps, sub-national governments."" The idea is that as long as the constituent
units (member states) act as they are expected, there is less need to impose
rules and standards from the center. 249 Member governments within Europe
are given ample room to determine the appropriate level of rights and regula-
tions in the competitive economic environment. Policy decisions are made
on a level as close as possible to the one on which they are implemented
while remaining consonant with basic national principles.2
In an attempt to better harmonize insider trading regulations, application
of the concept of subsidiarity may constitute one avenue to consider. First,
the United States' unilateral approach, best demonstrated by the SEC's mo-
tions to compel, does not effectively impede insider trading."' Such unilat-
eral action applies United States laws, and the SEC policy objectives, over
conflicting foreign laws.2 The disregard for national sovereignty results in
the creation of blocking statutes, secrecy laws, and the disappearance of co-
operation. Just as the United States does not want its policies hinging on the
interests of other nations, it must recognize that foreign nations share a simi-
lar feeling. "3 If the United States continues to ignore the sovereign rights of
nations, foreign nations will refuse to renegotiate and broaden their MOUs
246.. See KOLE & D'AMATO, supra note 7, at 59-69.
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. See id. The analogue of "full faith and credit" in the United States. See id.
250. See id.
251. See Andrew S. Brooslin, Enforcing Insider Trading Laws: The Need for Interna-
tional Cooperation, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 397, 418 (1997). A Rule 37 motion
would force a foreign institution to release records in violation of the law of the nation in
which it is situated. See id.
252. See id.
253. See Caroline A.A. Greene, International Securities Law Enforcement: Recent Ad-
vances in Assistance and Cooperation, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 635, 670 (1994).
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with the United States"M The ultimate goal is to agree on as much as possi-
ble, on the most essential elements of insider trading rules, and yet, at the
same time, allow for the United States and the EU to coordinate the essen-
tials of these goals by whatever means they find most efficient on a domestic
level.
From a practical view, the benefits of MOUs should be more readily
recognized and expanded upon. The cooperative nature of MOUs present an
impressive foundation upon which to build a stronger and more cohesive se-
ries of agreements. Their existence demonstrates a transnational desire to
halt insider trading,"' especially because MOUs promote the mutual ex-
change information necessary for the investigation of insider trading.
CONCLUSION
The EU Directive has admittedly introduced and harmonized relatively
sophisticated insider trading laws throughout several European countries.
However, specific provisions of the EU Directive have created uncertainties
with regard to prohibiting countries from continuing a course of conduct
substantially similar to past practices of indifference toward insider trading.
The EU Directive's approach, largely modeled after the SEC regulations,
may ultimately fail to provide the hoped for deterrence. Some of the factors
which contribute to the incomplete success of the EU Directive include the
United States' fear of lowered standards and requirements in securities regu-
lation, difficulties in agreeing upon definitions within the area of insider
trading, legal cultural distinctions, and intolerance. However, by relying
more on procedures such as MOUs and the concept of subsidiarity, while at
the same time demanding an increased tolerance of legal cultural differences,
will perhaps offer an approach to viewing rules from two different conti-
nents in an increasingly harmonious context.
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